Comm PA Dept Env Protection v. Lockheed Martin Corp by unknown
2012 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-5-2012 
Comm PA Dept Env Protection v. Lockheed Martin Corp 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012 
Recommended Citation 
"Comm PA Dept Env Protection v. Lockheed Martin Corp" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 797. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/797 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 




                                                       PRECEDENTIAL  
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
   
 
No. 10-4078 
   
 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 








UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; COMMONWEALTH OF 
PENNSYLVANIA; DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION 
AND NATURAL RESOURCES 
 
       Lockheed Martin Corporation,           











On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 1-09-cv-00821) 
District Judge:  Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo 
      
 
 
Argued on September 20, 2011 
 
 




(Opinion filed: June 5, 2012 ) 
 
 
Raymond B. Ludwiszewski, Esquire 
Michael K. Murphy, Esquire (Argued) 
Daniel E. Schmitt, Esquire 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP 
1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. 
9th Floor 
Washington, DC   20036 
 
David J. Parsells, Esquire 
Stevens & Lee 
620 Freedom Business Center 
Suite 200 
King of Prussia, PA   19406 
 
   Counsel for Appellant 
Julie E. Ravis, Esquire 
3 
 
Stevens & Lee 
111 North Sixth St. 
Reading, PA   19603 
 
   Counsel for Appellant 
 
Kimberly A. Hummel, Esquire (Argued) 
Office of Chief Counsel 
Department of Conservation and Natural Resources 
400 Market Street 
7th Floor 
Harrisburg, PA   17105 
 
Gregory E. Dunlap, Esquire 
Office of General Counsel 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
333 Market Street 
17th Floor 
Harrisburg, PA   17101 
 
   Counsel for Appellee 
 
    
 
O P I N I O N  





 This appeal involves a dispute between the Lockheed 
Martin Corporation on one hand and the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania and one of its administrative agencies, the 
Department of Conservation and Natural Resources (DCNR), 
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on the other.  Lockheed appeals the Order of the District 
Court, dismissing Lockheed’s third-party complaint against 
the Commonwealth and DCNR.  Lockheed contends that the 
District Court erred by concluding that the Commonwealth 
and DCNR retained their Eleventh Amendment immunity 
from suit when the Pennsylvania Department of 
Environmental Protection (PADEP), another Commonwealth 
agency, voluntarily filed a complaint in federal court against 
Lockheed pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 
(CERCLA), 42  U.S.C. § 9607(a).  For the reasons expressed 
below, we will vacate the judgment of the District Court and 
remand this case with instructions to dismiss for mootness the 
third party complaint against the Commonwealth and DCNR.  
Because of mootness, we will not address the merits of the 
Eleventh Amendment immunity issue.  
 
I.  
 A.  Use and Contamination of the Quehanna Facility 
Background 
In 1957, as an effort to develop the local economy, the 
Commonwealth constructed the Quehanna Wild Area Nuclear 
Site (Facility) in the Quehanna Wild Area of the Moshannon 
State Forest in Clearfield County, Pennsylvania.  After the 
Facility’s construction, the Commonwealth sold and leased a 
portion of the site to the Curtiss-Wright Corporation.  
Sometime in the early 1960s, Curtiss-Wright donated the 
Facility to Pennsylvania State University.  From 1962 through 
1967, Martin Marietta Corporation, a Lockheed predecessor, 
leased portions of the Facility from Penn State to conduct 
work pursuant to Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) 
contracts.  This work involved experimentation with 
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Strontium-90, a radioactive isotope.1
 
  Throughout the period 
that Martin Marietta conducted its research, the AEC, as 
licensing authority, and Penn State, as landlord, exercised 
oversight over operations at the Facility.  In 1966, Penn State 
transferred legal title of the Facility to the Commonwealth.  
The following year, Martin Marietta’s contract with the AEC 
expired, and Martin Marietta terminated its activities at the 
Facility.  As a prerequisite to the contract’s termination, 
Martin Marietta was required, pursuant to the standards 
established by the AEC and approved by Penn State, to 
partially decontaminate the Facility.  According to Lockheed, 
at the time that legal title of the Facility transferred to the 
Commonwealth, the Commonwealth was aware that unknown 
quantities of Strontium-90 remained at the site and could not 
be removed without dismantling the entire Facility, an 
outcome contrary to its and Penn State’s interests.  After 
Martin Marietta completed the partial decontamination of the 
Facility, its lease terminated, and, with the Commonwealth’s 
knowledge, it transferred its license for possession of 
Strontium-90 to Penn State.  
When Martin Marietta’s involvement with the Facility 
ended, the Commonwealth leased the site to several other 
companies that are not parties to this suit.  The new tenants 
continued to use the Facility for activities involving  
radioactive materials, including Strontium-90.  Lockheed 
alleges that as encouragement for one company to lease the 
Facility, the Commonwealth and PADEP agreed to assume all 
responsibility for any existing Strontium-90.   
                                              
1 Martin Marietta’s possession and use of Strontium-90 
was pursuant to a license from the AEC.  
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At some point in the 1990s, the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission2
 
 (NRC) ordered the Commonwealth, PADEP, 
and DCNR to decommission the Facility.  This process 
required the Commonwealth and PADEP to clean up and 
remove all remaining Strontium-90.  As a result, PADEP and 
the Commonwealth incurred expenses in excess of $20 
million.  
B.  Litigation 
In 2009, PADEP, the Commonwealth agency 
authorized to administer and enforce CERCLA, filed a 
complaint against Lockheed under CERCLA, 42 § U.S.C. 
9607(a), and several state statutes for recovery of 
approximately $20 million in unreimbursed costs the 
Commonwealth and PADEP had incurred in connection with 
their decommissioning of the Facility and removal of the 
remaining Strontium-90.  In its answer to the complaint, 
Lockheed raised the affirmative defense of recoupment, 
alleging that “[i]n an allocation of responsibility under 
CERCLA, Plaintiff should recover less than its demand for 
equitable reasons, including, but not limited to, its own 
conduct and liability and the doctrines of unclean hands, 
estoppel, waiver, laches, and/or other equitable defenses.”  
Lockheed also filed a counterclaim against PADEP, asserting 
that, if it is liable for PADEP’s cleanup costs, it seeks 
contribution under CERCLA and state law. See 42  U.S.C. § 
                                              
2 The NRC is one of the successor agencies of the 
AEC.  At the time of its formation, the NRC assumed 






   Lockheed alleged that PADEP “is liable under 
CERCLA as an owner and operator of the Quehanna Facility, 
and as a person who arranged for and/or transported 
hazardous substances or waste that were disposed of . . . from 
the facility,” and that “for decades beginning in the 1960’s, 
[PADEP] participated in and made decisions about the use, 
handling, storage, and alleged disposal of” Strontium-90 at 
the Facility.  
In addition to its counterclaim, Lockheed filed a third-
party complaint, which named the Commonwealth, DCNR, 
and the United States as defendants and sought contribution 
pursuant to CERCLA and state law.4
 
  See 42  U.S.C. § 
9613(f)(1).  In the third party complaint, Lockheed repeated 
the allegations contained in its counterclaim against PADEP 
and argued that, if it is liable for cleanup costs under 
CERCLA, it is entitled to contribution from the 
Commonwealth and DCNR for their allocable share of any 
costs Lockheed must pay PADEP.  In other words, Lockheed 
asked for relief only if it was found liable; it did not seek an 
affirmative judgment against the Commonwealth or DCNR.   
                                              
3 Section 9613(f)(1) provides: 
 Any person may seek contribution from any other 
person who is liable or potentially liable under section 
9607(a) of this title, during or following any civil action 
under . . . section 9607(a) of this title. . . .  In resolving 
contribution claims, the court may allocate response costs 
among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court 
determines are appropriate 
4  The United States is not a party to this appeal. 
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According to Lockheed, it filed the third-party 
complaint because it believed that Pennsylvania law required 
it to sue the Commonwealth and its agencies in their 
individual capacities.  In response to Lockheed’s third-party 
complaint, the Commonwealth and DCNR moved to dismiss, 
arguing that the complaint must be dismissed because, under 
the Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, they are 
immune from suit.  The District Court agreed and dismissed 
Lockheed’s third-party complaint against the Commonwealth 
and DCNR.  The court, however, left undisturbed Lockheed’s 
recoupment defense and CERCLA contribution counterclaim 
against PADEP. 
 
Lockheed then sought a supplemental ruling from the 
District Court, asking it to clarify whether the dismissal of its 
third-party complaint precluded it “from offsetting its liability 
based upon the conduct of all non-PADEP Commonwealth 
actors.”  In addition, Lockheed requested that the court certify 
the order for immediate appeal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
54(b). 
 
The District Court responded that “[t]he scope of 
[Lockheed’s] counterclaims against PADEP is limited to what 
is asserted by [Lockheed] in its counterclaims, specifically, 
that to the extent [Lockheed] is found liable for clean-up costs  
 
PADEP is also liable for the same.”  The court also 
reiterated that the remaining issues were PADEP’s claims 
against Lockheed, Lockheed’s counterclaim against PADEP, 
and Lockheed’s third-party claims against the United States.  
The court then certified its order, dismissing the third-party 
complaint against the Commonwealth and DCNR, as a final 
judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b). 
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Lockheed appealed because it believed the District 
Court’s order precluded it from seeking 
contribution/recoupment from the Commonwealth and 
DCNR, and that the exclusion of these two entities would 
unfairly prejudice its defense.  The basis for Lockheed’s 
concern was the fact that PADEP and DCNR were created in 
1995 when the Commonwealth split their predecessor agency, 
the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources.  
Thus, PADEP did not exist at the time the facts underlying 
Lockheed’s recoupment/contribution claims allegedly 
occurred.  Therefore, Lockheed feared that, if it did not join 
the Commonwealth and PADEP to this litigation, its “defense 
will be materially and improperly impaired because PADEP 
may not qualify as a potentially responsible party under 
CERCLA, as it did not even exist as an entity when the 





 Before we can reach the merits of the immunity issue, 
we must first determine whether the parties’ briefing and 
statements during argument mooted this appeal.  If the issues 
have become moot, i.e., are no longer “live,” the case will be 
moot and therefore nonjusticiable.  See Donovan ex rel. 
Donovan v. Punxsutawney Area Sch. Bd., 336 F.3d 211, 
216 (3d Cir. 2003) (“If a case has become moot after the 
district court's entry of judgment, an appellate court no longer 
has jurisdiction to entertain the appeal”) (citing Mills v. 
Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895)); see also Rogin v. 
Bensalem Twp., 616 F.2d 680, 684 (3d Cir. 1980); In re 
Surrick, 338 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2003).  A case or 
controversy requires “(1) a legal controversy that is real and 
not hypothetical, (2) a legal controversy that affects an 
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individual in a concrete manner so as to provide the factual 
predicate for reasoned adjudication, and (3) a legal 
controversy with sufficiently adverse parties so as to sharpen 
the issues for judicial resolution.” Id.
 
  
In the briefing and argument before us, it became 
increasingly clear that this appeal arose from a 
misunderstanding between the parties.  In their brief, the 
Commonwealth and DCNR acknowledged that the 
Commonwealth was the real party in interest in PADEP’s 
lawsuit and that Lockheed’s third-party complaint was not 
necessary because Lockheed had already filed defensive 
counterclaims against the Commonwealth.  With respect to 
Lockheed’s claims against DCNR, the Commonwealth also 
admitted that Lockheed could raise defensive claims against 
DCNR by including those allegations in its counterclaim.  In 
its reply brief, Lockheed viewed the Commonwealth’s 
statements as a concession and opined that “[i]f the 
Commonwealth’s brief means what it appears to say, there 
should be no real practical dispute remaining between the 
parties.”  
 
 During argument, both the Commonwealth and 
Lockheed acknowledged that no dispute remained before the 
Court.   
MR. MURPHY: . . . Lockheed 
Martin wants to be able to reduce 
its liability based on the activities 
of the other Commonwealth 
agencies and instrumentalities in 
response to the PA DEP suit.  And 




The Court asked the 
Commonwealth: 
 
THE COURT: [C]an 
Lockheed reduce its liability to 
the Commonwealth by the actions 
of other Pennsylvania entities that 
caused the environmental damage 
here? 
 
MS. HUMMEL: . . . [Y]es, 
Lockheed can raise those 
defenses, raise those issues of 
liability to the extent the district 
court finds that in fact there is real 
liability associated with that, there 
is no immunity to liability of 
those claims, yes.   
 
 The court can consider that 
and reduce the judgment against 
Lockheed. 
 
THE COURT: Is it your 
position that any recoupment 
claim that Lockheed Martin has 
against any state actor [and] the 
Commonwealth can be recouped 
through its counterclaim against 
DEP? . . .  
 
THE COURT: Arising from 
this transaction, or this incident. 
12 
 
MS. HUMMEL: It can be 
raised, certainly. 
 
*   *   * 
 
THE COURT: [T]he 
question is if you waive by 
litigation sovereign immunity as 
to a Commonwealth entity, why 
don’t you waive by litigation the 
sovereign immunity with respect 
to other Commonwealth entities 
that are involved with regard to 
this particular series of incidents? 
 
MS. HUMMEL: In terms of 
the . . . district court’s ability to 
hear that defense, to consider 
owner-operator - - I mean the 
issue here is owner-operator 
liability.  The Commonwealth 
owned the site, Lockheed has 
asserted that the Commonwealth, 
other agencies operated the site.  
The district court’s ability to 
consider those issues in, in the 
defensive mode, it can do that to 
offset what DEP is seeking to 
recover from Lockheed. 
 




THE COURT: [C]an 
Lockheed reduce its liability to 
the Commonwealth by the actions 
of other Pennsylvania entities that 
caused the environmental damage 
here? 
 
MS. HUMMEL: . . . [Y]es, 
Lockheed can raise those 
defenses, raise those issues of 
liability to the extent the district 
court finds that in fact there is real 
liability associated with that, there 
is no immunity to liability of 
those claims, yes.  The court can 
consider that and reduce the 
judgment against Lockheed. 
 
THE COURT: And that’s 
across the board for Pennsylvania 
- -  
 
MS. HUMMEL: Yes. 
 
THE COURT: - - entities 
involved - -  
 
MS. HUMMEL: Yes. 
 
THE COURT: - - in what 
transpired at this site? 
 
MS. HUMMEL: Yes. 
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 Lockheed made similar responses to the 
court’s questioning: 
 
THE COURT: . . . [I]sn’t the 
counterclaim enough?  Aren’t you 
covered? . . . You heard what she 
said here today, and if - - you 
could live with that, right? 
 
MR. MURPHY: I could . . ..  
 
Based upon the Commonwealth’s briefing and oral 
representations before the court, we conclude that it conceded 
that PADEP’s potential recovery can be reduced in proportion 
to the liability attributable to the Commonwealth and DCNR.  
In other words, the Commonwealth now acknowledges that if 
Lockheed is liable for cleanup costs under CERCLA, 
Lockheed can recover contribution from the Commonwealth 
and DCNR for their allocable share of any costs Lockheed 
must pay PADEP.5
 
  This concession moots the sovereign 
immunity issue because it removes the live legal controversy 
between the parties.  See Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 
337, 340 (3d Cir. 2004) (“An offer of complete relief will 
generally moot the plaintiff's claim, as at that point the 
plaintiff retains no personal interest in the outcome of the 
litigation”); see also Rand v. Monsanto Co., 926 F.2d 596, 
598 (7th Cir. 1991).   
Lockheed repeatedly acknowledged that its primary 
concern was whether it could seek recoupment/contribution 
                                              
5  Lockheed cannot, as it acknowledges, obtain an 
affirmative judgment from the Commonwealth or DCNR.   
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from the Commonwealth and DCNR and that it was of “no 
practice importance” whether it could offset its liability with a 
counterclaim or third party complaint.  Since the parties now 
agree that Lockheed can obtain contribution from the 
Commonwealth and DCNR through Lockheed’s 
counterclaim, Lockheed does not retain an interest in the 
outcome of the immunity issue.  The District Court’s order 
will, therefore, be vacated6
 
 and the case remanded to the 
District Court  with instructions to dismiss the third party 
complaint against the Commonwealth and DCNR and for 
further proceedings.   
III.  
For the reasons stated above, we will vacate the order 
of June 30, 2010, of the District Court and remand this case 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Conclusion 
                                              
6  “The established practice . . . in dealing with a civil 
case . . . which has become moot while under review is to 
reverse or vacate the judgment below and remand with a 
direction to dismiss.” Rendell v. Rumsfeld, 484 F.3d 236, 243 
(3d Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 
340 U.S. 36, 39 (1950)).   
